Abhasa Yoga Vashista Mandelbrot Set
The Concept of Ābhāsa in the Yogavāsiṣṭha – 3

Concluding part of a 3 part series on the concept of Ābhāsa in the Yogavāsiṣṭha.

Abhāsa as Pure Consciousness

The above description establishes that, depending upon the context, the concept of ābhāsa confirms subjective illusonism, non-dual awareness, the monistic perspective of consciousness alone, or the non-substantial nature of all the entities that appear.  Common to all these understandings is the notion that ābhāsa stands for something that is not real.  This, however, is not the only application in which the term ābhāsa has been used.  There are several instances where ābhāsa is used as synonymous to consciousness (cid).  This position confirms the monistic perspective that illusion in form of subject and object or in form of the world has never occurred.

A general agreement among the schools applying the term ābhāsa is that it is māyā or avidyā that gives rise to duality.  This, however, is not always the case, as shown by other instances of its occurrence in MUŚ.  In some, ābhāsa is not caused due to ignorance but it is consciousness (cid) itself and without any external cause.[1]  Following this understanding, the world in the form of time, space, and so on is compared to the momentary appearance of lightning, affirming that consciousness itself is momentarily appearing in the form of the external world.[2]  Along these lines, it is this ‘shining’ (bhās) and not ‘false appearance’ of the very solitary awareness free from beginning and end, that gives rise to the concept of plurality.[3]  The examples that agree with this specific understanding, wherein the objects of perception are considered as ābhāsa, as well as cognition or the absence of cognition, are identified with the same term ābhāsa.[4]  In these instances, the application of ābhāsa is in order to confirm the existence of Brahman alone.

The apparent discrepancy in Advaita literature, where the world is identified at the same time with ignorance as well as Brahman, needs to be explored in order to demonstrate how MUŚ reconciles this contradiction.  If the world is identical to Brahman, then, ābhāsa does not explain illusory nature, as there is no illusion as such.  On the other hand, the world cannot be the very Brahman shining, if the world is a false projection of illusion. The text demonstrates awareness of this contradiction. MUŚ distinguishes these two positions and confirms that the first position, the negation of the world identified with error, functions as a pedagogical strategy to confirm the higher position that there exists only Brahman.[5]

When ābhāsa is understood as ‘shining,’ or ‘illumination,’ the world is perceived as identical to Brahman.  This concept rejects any origination and establishes ekasattā, the Advaitic stance that establishes a single degree of reality. Although rare in application, this specific position contrasts with the general agreement between the applications of the term ābhāsa found in Mahāyānic Advaya and Upaniṣadic Advaita.  Following this position, the world and Brahman do not posit two different degrees of reality and ābhāsamātra in this context does not refer to the falsity of the world but rather to the self-aware nature of the Brahman:

ananyac chāntam ābhāsamātram ākāśanirmalam |

brahmaiva jagad ity etat sarvaṃ sattvāvabodhataḥ ||

YV, Utpatti 9.30[6]

With the knowledge of the reality (sattva), the world (jagat) is the very Brahman, [and] thus all of this [is] identical [to Brahman], in its essential form, of the character of consciousness only (ābhāsamātra) and free from impurities, such as the [clear] sky.[7]

The application of the term ābhāsamātra in the above example is noteworthy, as this understanding is congruent with other instances where cinṃātra or dṛṣṭimātra is instead applied.  The interpretation of the term ābhāsamātra as ‘consciousness only’ is also supported by the commentary of Ānandabo-dhendra.[8]  This understanding is found elsewhere, as in the following application of the term is in the sense of pure awareness:

anādicinmātranabho yat tat kāraṇakāraṇam |

anantaṃ śāntam ābhāsamātram avyayam ātatam ||

YV, Nirvāṇa II 82.4

The sky of the character of awareness only, free from beginning, is the cause of all the causes.  This is endless, free from functionings, appearance only (ābhāsamātra), free from destruction, and all-pervading.

evam ābhāsamātrasya kacato ’niśam avyayam |

sargādimadhyāntadṛśo mudhaivātroditāḥ sthitāḥ ||

YV, Nirvāṇa 94.63

In this way, of this ‘appearance only’ (ābhāsamātra), which is forever shining and indestructible, the perceptions of the beginning, middle, and end of creation are falsely arising or existing in this [essential nature].

bhittimātraṃ yathā citrajagad ālokamātrakam |

citi cidvyomamātrātma tathaivābhāsamātrakam ||

YV, Nirvāṇa II, 168.6

As the world in a painting is merely the canvas alone, [comprised of] perception (āloka) only, in the same way, [the world is] only ābhāsa, of the character of the void of consciousness in consciousness [alone].

Further strengthening the aforementioned understanding of ābhāsa as pure consciousness with the self-aware nature of consciousness, MUŚ/YV uses this term as identical to the witnessing self (sākṣin), and it is considered as the foundation for the functions that gives rise to the notion of duality.  As explained:

sākṣiṇi sphāra ābhāse dhruve dīpa iva kriyāḥ |

sati yasmin pravartante cittehāḥ spandapūrvikāḥ ||

YV, Utpatti 9.68[9]

As in the existence of a lamp, actions [are revealed], in the existence of the unbound and witnessing awareness, the activities of mind manifest subsequent to the pulsation [of mind].

Remarkably, the witnessing self in this verse is identified as ābhāsa, in whose existence the functions of various forms occur.  The metaphor of lamp given in this verse requires explanation.  The verb ‘to illuminate’ (pra+√kāś) is applied to describe the function of lamp. However, a lamp cannot be an agent of the action of illumination.  The ābhāsa or shining of the witnessing self is considered to be the same.  With this example of lamp, luminosity is explicitly of the character of awareness.  This shining, or the active engagement of being aware of something, does not constitute duality of the self.  The appearance of the world is what appears in this awareness itself, when ābhāsa is used to describe the world.  In fact, ābhāsa is not the outward appearance, but the character of consciousness.[10]  Along the lines of this interpretation, nirābhāsa, a state of mind free from agitation, denotes the state of ābhāsa, or the flashing of the character of the self.[11]

This ābhāsa or illumination is considered as action only relative to the entity that it manifests.  In one example where the concept of ābhāsa and pratibimba tally, this notion explicitly considers that something appears in the relative sense:

mukure cāmalābhāse pratibimbaṃ pravartate |

YV, Nirvāṇa I, 36.11

Counter-image occurs in the shining mirror free from dust (amala).

Explicitly, it is the nature of mirror to reflect what is in front of its surface.  This, however, does not mean that the mirror, ‘reflecting’ objects, is an agent of action that does certain activities.  Congruent with this understanding, ābhāsa and cit are described as property and substance.  Following one example found in MUŚ, just as gems have their radiance, so also is awareness endowed with worlds.[12]  Creation, following this understanding, is identical to Brahman.  This identity can be found described in terms of waves and the ocean, where the waves are, although considered to be different from and originated of the ocean, not separate from ocean itself.[13]  This understanding of ‘as identical to Brahman’ helps explain verses like:

dikkālādyanavacchinnarūpatvād ativistṛtam |

            tad anādyantam ābhāsaṃ bhāsanīyavivarjitam ||

YV, Utpatti 10.33

The Brahman {tat} is beginningless and endless and omnipresent (ativistṛta) because it is free from the limitations of space, time, and so on.  [It is] ābhāsa,[14] devoid of entities to be illuminated.

This ābhāsa is described in terms of the supreme (para), one (eka), and unmade (akṛtṛma).[15]  Also described as sadābhāsa and identified with sat, a synonym of the Brahman, it explains the awareness pertinent to liberated beings who have freed their minds from the entities of perception.[16]  Three terms, sat, cid, and ābhāsa describe this non-dual awareness that is free from modifications.  This ābhāsa, identical to sat, is the foundation where kalā arises, which in turn gives rise to functionings.  This non-dual ābhāsa and the rise of kalā are compared to water and the waves.[17]

Congruent with the understanding of ābhāsa as awareness, this ābhāsamātra is amala or free from defilements, and is conscious of all sentient beings.  This is Brahman, identical to awareness (cid).[18] Cinmātra or consciousness only as the highest principle, identical to ābhāsa, is explained in terms of self-awareness (svānubhūti) and described as the immediate awareness in all instances.[19]  These instances only verify that the application of ābhāsa in Advaita literature does not always confirm the illusory nature of entities that are described in terms of ābhāsa. These descriptions further function to portray the self-luminous nature of awareness, which in other instances is depicted in terms of prakāśa or svaprakāśa.[20]

This ābhāsa, described as the essential nature, is undoubtedly the very Brahman, with the passage applying the term ābhāsa parallel to terms such as essence (sāra), unborn (aja), free from beginning and end (ādyantaśūnya), and one (eka).[21] This understanding of ābhāsa differs from the one that stands for illusory appearance in the sense that it is pure and is of the character of the self, free from mental modifications.[22] If this ābhāsa is understood as other than the awareness of the character of the self, it will be difficult to comprehend instances such as the following:

yat saṃvedyavinirmuktaṃ saṃvedanam anirmitam |

cetyamuktaṃ cidābhāsaṃ tad viddhi paramaṃ padam ||

YV, Nirvāṇa I 6.4

You should know the awareness that is free from the object of consciousness [and which is] not constructed, the ābhāsa of consciousness that is free from objects of consciousness as the highest stage (pada).

As in the instance above, cidābhāsa describes the very awareness itself with its inherent nature of shining.  This cidābhāsa is free from mental modifications (nirvikalpa),[23] which further confirms that the meaning of cidābhāsa in this instance is different from the application of this term in scholastic Advaita.

As it has been pointed out, the term ābhāsa is used in two opposite senses: in the sense of pure awareness and to describe its self-luminous nature, and in the sense of false appearance.  This understanding further complicates the reductive sense of meaning that can be derived from MUŚ/YV, where ābhāsa follows the scholastic Advaita understanding of false appearance.  Particularly, one cannot escape from the influence of mainstream Advaita while reading commentaries on MUŚ/YV.[24]  With this new understanding of ābhāsa, the necessity for an overarching philosophy that can resolve the contradictions within the single text becomes apparent.  Arguably, the early Bhedābheda doctrine can resolve this apparent inconsistency.  The foundation for this understanding is that duality and singularity are similar to the waves and the ocean: waves do not exist independent of the ocean and the duality seen in the perception of waves does not constitute duality when perceived as water.

Cinmātra and Ābhāsa in Light of the Concept of Bhedābheda 

The biggest hermeneutical challenge posed by MUŚ/YV is to resolve the contradiction occurring with the application of terminology in which the same language sometimes refers to something non-substantial, essentially false, and illusory, or at other times refers to the highest reality, the only reality that exists.  Textual interpretation of ābhāsa could take any direction, without one philosophical position that allows for multiple understandings.  In particular, the understanding of ābhāsa as pure consciousness itself does not even seem possible if the ābhāsa model of the scholastic Advaita of Śaṅkara is followed.

This problem of textual interpretation can be resolved more easily if a different philosophical model is adopted as the foundation for the concept that permeates MUŚ/YV.  The doctrine of Bhedābheda, assigned to Bhartṛprapañca, an Advaitin earlier than Śaṅkara, arguably, gives an easier philosophical model for the hermeneutical challenge the text poses.  Following this model, bheda, or difference, and abheda, or the absence of difference, are not inherently contradictory.  These are two modes of the same reality.  Along these lines, prapañca, or verbal construction is what constitutes duality and vilaya or dissolution of such verbal construction, rejects the notion of duality.

This understanding also recognizes the Brahman’s powers (śakti) to manifest in the form of the world, just as the ocean can take the shape of waves.  This position does not reject the essential monistic position of the state in which there is no creation, that of pure Brahman itself.  This position can be easily reconciled with the positon of Maṇḍana which utilizes prasaṅkhyāna or mental reflection to resolve the difference that gives rise to the notion of duality.  More appropriately, this position allows the active life to be a part of realization, as in the case of Janaka or Rāma, both kings and central characters in the philosophical epic, MUŚ/YV.

In order to confirm that, while adopting the concept of ābhāsa in the YV, there are nonetheless instances that support the notion of bhedābheda, it is contextual to analyze some passages. The application of ābhāsa to describe luminosity serves as a model to describe the world as an inherent nature of Brahman:

yathā dravatvaṃ salilaṃ spandatvaṃ pavano yathā |

yathā prakāśa ābhāso brahmaiva trijagat tathā ||

YV, Utpatti 11.19

As the fluidity of water, the undulation (spandana) of wind, the luminosity (ābhāsa) of light, so is the world of Brahman.

Following this understanding, there is no actual dissolution of the world, as the world is the property of Brahman, just as luminosity inheres to light.  For liberation, then, the individual recognizes its own essential nature.  Here, ābhāsa is the nature of Brahman, like the light of the sun. The world is not once more assigned to ignorance.  Again, explaining origination as verbal construction, the text compares the rise of the world in pure awareness to the ‘shining of the sun’ that permeates the sky.  For the sun is light itself and is not shining or illuminating.[25]

This description suggests that there is actually no origination, but not because what appears is illusion in its phenomenal sense, but because what is considered as originated and different from its cause is not different in reality.  For instance:

yathāmbhasataraṅgādi yathā hemno ’ṅgadādi ca |

tad evātad ivābhāsaṃ tathāhambhāvabhāvitaḥ ||

YV, Nirvāṇa I, 112.6

As the waves etc. of water and as bracelet etc. of gold, the very [substance] appears as if not that.  The same [is the case with] something imagined by I-sense.

The rejection of entities with an application of the term ābhāsa needs to be read in light of this stance, where negation functions only to reject duality due to linguistic construction.[26]  This understanding of ābhāsa aligns with the ekasattā doctrine that there exists only a single reality.[27]  In this context, the question then is, what is ābhāsa?  MUŚ explains ābhāsa in terms of ‘pṛthak cetanam ābhāsa’ (appearance is to be aware differently).[28]

And what is the liberated state in which there is no duality and no bondage?  It is apparent that, in this understanding, having the world or not having the world is not what causes bondage.  Rather, it is the false perception of difference.  This, however, does not reject the non-dual state.  Following the example of waves and water, just as there is calm water in the absence of waves, so also is there the essential consciousness only in which the world is dissolved.[29]

Following the example of the waves caused by the breezes of the wind, the world is described in terms of dṛśyābhāsa (appearance of the objects of perception).[30]  To illuminate is the inherent nature of pure consciousness, and its shining is explained in terms of the worlds of waking or dreaming.[31]  Duality in the form of the world and awareness in its essential nature are two aspects that are always present: the world appears when perceived in terms of world, and there is never the world but only consciousness when perceived in those terms.[32]  Bondage and liberation are two perceptions: for the one who perceives bondage, he is bound, and for one who perceives liberation, he is liberated.  There is no phenomenal change, but only the change in perception, because it is merely a verbal construction that creates duality in terms of the subject of experience, other subjects, and the world of experience.[33]


Clearly, from the above description, select terminology is shared by different and sometimes contradictory philosophical positions.  It cannot be argued that a term’s meaning is found in its earliest historical occurrence, thus ruling out other possibilities.  The case of ābhāsa explicitly compels multiple understandings of the same term.  This again is directly antithetical to the argument that meaning can be reduced to a single understanding of a term found in one philosophy or one text, particularly YV.  Although identified as one single text, YV displays multiple nuances of concepts, and the terms used preserve multiple meanings.  However, it is not the intent of this paper to leave the meaning open-ended, for textual interpretation is possible only when certain terms provide certain meaning.  The quest for an overarching philosophy that can allow apparent contradiction, in this case resolved by the concept of Bhedābheda, is an approach for deciphering textual meaning which can be established by peeling away the layers of history built up as texts accrue multiple understandings and embody apparent contradiction.  The reduction of textual meaning to one single sense is not possible, as this analysis demonstrates, wherein the authors of texts employ crucial technical terms in their fluid sense and in that way, are not exact in their application of terms, metaphors, or examples.  It is therefore not reasonable to interpret or translate texts in a reductive fashion without considering the overarching philosophy of the text, as the terms found in the text have to be congruent with the foundational thought the text provides.  Just as the example of dream does not confirm the same philosophy although it is found equally in Madhyamaka, Yogācāra, and Advaita texts, so also is the case with the term ābhāsa.  It is also explicit that a single text does not always use a term with the same meaning.  Whether or not the term ābhāsa refers to false appearance, what is consistent in the case of YV is that the term is congruent with the philosophy of cinmātra, where the non-dual awareness in itself is free from the discourse of affirmation or negation.


[1] YV, Nirvāṇa II, 195.45.

[2] janayaty accham ābhāsaṃ bhaṅguraṃ sphuraṇāt svataḥ | jagadrūpaṃ niśāvidyud iva cit kālakhādi ca ||  MUŚ, Nirvāṇa 134.2

[3] evam ādyantarahitam ekam evedam ātatam | ittham ābhāsate bhāsā svayā nānyāsti kalpanā ||  MUŚ, Nirvāṇa 136.12.

[4] ābhāsamātram evedaṃ dṛśyam ity avabudhyate . . . bhedo ’tra vāci na tv arthe tasmān nāsty eva bhinnatā || YV, Nirvāṇa II, 103.14-16.

[5] bhrāntir eveyam ābhāti jagadābhāsarūpiṇī | bhrāntir evāpi vā naiva brahmasattaiva kevalā || MUŚ, Nirvāṇa 350.2.

[6] MUŚ reads this verse as: . . . ity eva satyaṃ satyāvabodhinaḥ || MUŚ, Utpatti 9.32.

[7] The commentary of Bhāskara on the Mokṣopāya thereon is also significant:

anena prasaṅgena jagadbrahmaṇoḥ aikyam eva punaḥ punaḥ kathayati [ananyac . . . |32|] jagat kartṛ | ananyat sarvarūpatvena sthitatvāt svavyatiriktavasturahitaṃ | śāntaṃ svarūpe viśrāntam | ābhāsa-mātra-kam ābhāsamātrasvarūpam | ākāśanirmalam ākāśavat svaccham | brahma eva bhavati | ity eva etad eva | satyāvabodhinaḥ satyajñānayuktasya | satyaṃ bhavati || The commentary of Bhāskara on MUŚ, Utpatti 9.32. For the commentary of Bhāskara on the Utpatti section of the MUŚ, see Walter Slaje, Bhāskarakaṇṭhas Mokṣopāya-Ṭīkā: Die Fragmente des 3. (Utpatti-) Prakaraṇa. Graz: EWS-Fachverlag, 1995.

[8] ābhāsamātram cinmātram . . .  Tātparyaprakāśa commentary on YV, Utpatti 9.30.

[9] Bhāskara’s commentary in this verse helps to clarify the metaphor of the lamp and the concept of witnessing self:

sākṣiṇi sarvāsāṃ staimityaspandāvasthānāṃ grāhakatvena sākṣibhūte | sphāre vyāpake | ābhāse sphurattaikasāre | dhruve udāsīne | yasmin sati sannidhimātraṃ bhajati sati | citrehāḥ nānāvidhāḥ manovyāpārāḥ | kathambhūtāḥ | spandapūrvikāḥ śarīraceṣṭāḥ | pravartante | tatsahitā ity arthaḥ | asati āntare kasmin cittattve vikalpānāṃ śarīraceṣṭānāṃ cotthānaṃ yuktaṃ na syād iti bhāvaḥ | kā iva | kriyā iva lokakriyā iva | yathā dīpe sannidhimātraṃ bhajati lokakriyā svayam eva pravartante | tathety arthaḥ || Bhāskara on MUŚ, Utpatti 9.70.

[10] nūnaṃ bodhe ’virūḍhasya nāhantā na jagatsthitiḥ || bhāsate paramābhāsarūpiṇaḥ kāpy avasthitiḥ | YV, Nirvāṇa II, 45.59-60.

[11] yaḥ prabuddho nirābhāsaṃ param ābhāsam āgataḥ | svacchāntaḥkaraṇaḥ śāntas taṃ svabhāvaṃ sa paśyati || YV, Nirvāṇa II, 52.38.

[12] kā nāma vimalābhāsās tasmin paramacinmaṇau | na kacanti vicinvanti vicitrāṇi jaganti yāḥ ||  YV, Nirvāṇa 37.2.

[13] For instance, see MUŚ, Utpatti 9.71, and the commentary of Bhāskara thereon.

[14] For explanation of Bhāskara: . . . bhāsanīyavivarjitam ābhāsajñeyarahitajñānasvarūpam ity arthaḥ || MUŚ, Utpatti, 10:33.

[15] sampannaḥ śāntam ābhāsaṃ param ekam akṛtrimam | kvāstam etu kva vodetu kīdṛgvapur asāv iti || MUŚ, Nirvāṇa 155.11.

[16] dṛśyād yo viratiṃ yāta ātmārāmaḥ śamaṃ gataḥ | sa sann eva sadābhāsaḥ paritīrṇabhavārṇavaḥ || YV, Nirvāṇa II, 38.31.

[17] saṃvedyenāparāmṛṣṭaṃ śāntaṃ sarvātmakaṃ ca yat | tat saccidābhāsamayam astīha kalanojjhitam || samudeti tatas tasmāt kalā kalanarūpiṇī | YV, Nirvāṇa I, 9.2-3.

[18] ābhāsamātram amalaṃ sarvabhūtāvabodhakam || sarvatrāvasthitaṃ śāntaṃ cidbrahmety anubhūyate | YV, Nirvāṇa I, 11.67-68.

[19] cinmātram amalābhāsaṃ kalākalanakalpanam | pratyakṣadṛśyaṃ sarvatra svānubhūtimayātmakam || YV, Nirvāṇa I, 39. 18.

[20] This reading of ābhāsa can be further confirmed by the application of ābhāsvara:

bhuvanāḍambarādarśe cidā [tmānam upāsmahe] | aciraskahakārāntam ābhāsvaram akhaṇḍitam || MUŚ Nirvāṇa 11.122.

[21] ajam asaram anādyaṃ buddham ādyantaśuddhaṃ śivam amalam ajalpaṃ sarvagaṃ śāntam ekam | bahir abahir apīśaṃ jñaṃ vinirmāṇam agryaṃ kam api tam upagamyaṃ sāram ābhāsam āhuḥ || MUŚ, Nirvāṇa 155.37.

[22] pratyakcetanam ābhāsaṃ śuddhaṃ saṅkalpavarjitam | agamyam enam ātmānaṃ viddhi duṣṭadṛśam iha || MUŚ, Nirvāṇa 62.5.

[23] tasmāt sāratarāt sāraḥ kiñcid anyan na vidyate | nirvikalpacidābhāsa eva sarvatra kāraṇam || MUŚ, Nirvāṇa 135.25.

[24] The application of ābhāsa in the following verse where sadābhāsa is identical to vyomātman can be interpreted in the first sense, pure awareness.  However the commentary of Bhāskara explains ābhāsa explicitly in the sense of illusory appearance:

ardhonmīlitadṛgbhrūbhūmadhyatārakavaj jagat | vyomātmaiva sadābhāsaṃ svarūpaṃ yo ‘bhipaśyati || . . . sadābhāsaṃ sad ivābhāsata iti sadābhāsam | paramārthato na sad ity arthaḥ || MUŚ, Utpatti, 9.56.

It contradicts with the following application of sadābhāsa, if the meaning of this term is derived only following the lines of Bhāskara:

etat tat sadābhāsam etat prāpya na śocyate | puṣpasyāntar ivāmodaṃ prāṇasyāntar avasthitam || MUŚ, Nirvāṇa 26.56.

[25] idaṃ tv acetyacinmātrabhānor bhānaṃ nabhaḥ prati |  tathā sūkṣmaṃ yathā meghaṃ prati saṅkalpavāridaḥ || tu viśeṣe | acetyacinmātrabhānoḥ cetyādūṣitacitsūryasya | bhānam ābhāsaḥ | idaṃ jagat |   MUŚ, Utpatti 15.11 and the commentary of Bhāskara.  This metaphor of sun is found elsewhere as well: taraṅgabhaṅgurāṇy antar bahiś cāvṛttimanti ca | ābhāsamātrarūpāṇi tejasy ātmavivasvataḥ || YV, Nirvāṇa II, 59.56.

[26] The verse in the sequence of gold and ornaments where the existence of the other is rejected is: tasmād anyan na tatrāsti yad asti ca sa eva tat | yac cānyat tattadābhāsaṃ na ca paśyati durmatiḥ || YV, Nirvāṇa 112.18.

[27] There is an explicit reference of ekasattā in MUŚ that tallies with this the examples discussed here: bṛṃhitā bharitākārā sattaikā pāramārthikī | ābhāsaiḥ prasphuraty evam abdhir ūrmyādibhir yathā || MUŚ, Nirvāṇa 124.45.

[28] pṛthak cetanam ābhāsaḥ saṃvid astīti niścaye | bhāvānām avikārāṇāṃ bhrāntijānām abhāvanāt || MUŚ, Nirvāṇa 127.11.

[29] spandātmatāyāṃ śāntāyāṃ yathāspandaṃ jaladravaḥ | na vetti jagadābhāsaṃ citaḥ prasaraṇaṃ tathā || MUŚ, Nirvāṇa 169.27.

[30] spandaśaktis tadicchedaṃ dṛśyābhāsaṃ tanoti sā | sākārasya narasyecchā yathā vā kalpanāpuram || MUŚ, Nirvāṇa 241.6.

[31] śuddhā saṃvit svabhāvasthā yat svayaṃ bhāti bhāsvarā | tasyā bhānasya tasyāsya jāgratsvapnābhidhāḥ kṛtāḥ || YV, Nirvāṇa II, 143.16.

[32] idaṃ tribhuvanābhāsam īdṛśaṃ bhāti sarvadā | śāntaṃ rāma samaṃ brahma neha nānāsti kiñcana ||  YV Nirvāṇa II, 212.15.

[33] tvam ahaṃ jagad ityādi śabdārthaiḥ brahma brahmaṇi | śāntaṃ samasamābhāsaṃ sthitam asthitam eva sat || YV, Nirvāṇa II, 54.2.

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